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ZONING AND POPULATION CONTROL-COURTS ARE RE-
ACTING TO NEW PROBLEMS IN OLD WAYS
Florida, like other states, has severe growing pains. Housing, water,
waste disposal, aesthetics, and overcrowding pose critical problems as
cities sprawl into surrounding areas. In some areas, recurrent crises
have required the use of water rationing as land use exceeds carrying
capacity. As a result, a number of communities have enacted local
ordinances to alleviate or avoid growth-related problems.' Such
attempts, however, necessarily restrict the freedom to travel-interstate
and intrastate-and inevitably limit access to housing, particularly
among low-income groups.
Initially, this note will outline how courts have traditionally
responded to zoning problems. It will then analyze two recent inno-
vative attempts to control growth, the "Petaluma Plan" (Petaluma,
California) and the "Boca Cap" (Boca Raton, Florida), in light of
recent cases and a variety of constitutional challenges. This note, how-
ever, does not address the potential impact of the Florida Environ-
mental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,2 the Local Govern-
ment Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975,3 or related legislation.
Nevertheless, attorneys working in the land use field should be aware
of the existence and importance of such legislation.
Essentially, this note will attempt to show the futility of attacking
growth control ordinances as violative of a federal right to travel or
1. See generally Bosselman, Growth Management and Constitutional Rights Part II:
The States Search for a Growth Policy, 11 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1976); Williams and Doughty,
Studies in Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29 RUTGE S L. REv.
73 (1975); Note, General Welfare and "No-Growth" Zoning Plans: Consideration of
Regional Needs by Local Authorities, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1975).
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975). Although chapter 380 stresses the desirability of local
implementation of land use planning objectives, the state has retained significant control
over "areas of critical state concern," § 380.05, and "developments of regional impact,"
§ 380.06. In Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, No. Y-362 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 10,
1977), the First District Court of Appeal invalidated, "as violative of Article II, Section
3, Florida Constitution, the Act's delegation of power [to the Governor and Cabinet]
to designate areas of critical state concern by criteria expressed in Section 380.05(2)(a)
and (b)." Slip op. at 16-17.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1975), entitled the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act of 1975, empowers and obligates counties, municipalities, and certain special
districts to formulate comprehensive plans by July 1, 1979. The act provides that once a
comprehensive plan is adopted, future development must be consistent with the plan.
Interestingly, § 163.3177(6)(f)4 provides that a comprehensive plan shall include
"[the provision of adequate sites for future housing, including housing for low- and
moderate-income families and mobile homes, with supporting infrastructure and
community facilities .... ." Thus chapters 163 and 380 may prove to be a double-
edged sword: local communities may exercise significant power over land use, yet their
plans must meet state requirements and their actions must be consistent with their plans.
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right to housing, despite exclusionary or discriminatory effects of the
ordinances. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions make it
clear that challenges to such ordinances will be successful in state
court under an appropriate state constitutional theory-or not at all.4
Finally, this note will show that many of the objectionable qualities
of a growth cap may be avoided by making specific provision in
local ordinances for low- and middle-income housing.
I. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL RESPONSES To ZONING PROBLEMS
Historically, federal courts have balanced judicial and legislative
authority when deciding zoning cases. The test for determining whether
zoning ordinances are valid was first set out in 1926 in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company:
"[I]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."5
Zoning must be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare"
before it can be declared unconstitutional. 6
Just two years after the Euclid decision, the United States Supreme
Court clarified the Euclid test in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.7 The
Court found a zoning ordinance of Cambridge, Massachusetts, un-
constitutional as applied, holding that a landowner's right to determine
the character of his property cannot be abrogated absent "a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."8
Since Euclid, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of the traditional categories of public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare, concomitantly expanding the reach of the state's police
power. In Berman v. Parker,9 the concept of the public welfare was
found broad enough to include values which were "spiritual as well
as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.""' A legislature constitution-
ally can implement its determination that a community should be
beautiful, spacious, and well-balanced.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,11 the police power was not
4. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
5. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), citing Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924).
6. Id. at 395.
7. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
8. Id. at 188, citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 395.
9. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (exercise of power of eminent domain, necessary for urban
renewal in Washington, D.C., held constitutional).
10. Id. at 33.
:11. 416 U.S. 1 .(1974).
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restricted to the narrow categories of public health and safety, but
rather was held "ample to lay out zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people.' 12 The scope of the police power was
interpreted broadly in Belle Terre, yet it has been expanded even
further in some jurisdictions. In Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills,"s
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a
zoning ordinance, shown to discriminate against the poor, because it
was "rationally related to preserving the town's rural environment."'1
The ordinance was judged by the rational basis test rather than given
strict scrutiny, because poverty is not a suspect classification. In Con-
struction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,15 it was held that
"the concept of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold
Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces
and low density of population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate
pace."' 16 Finally, in the recent case of Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,'7 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a zoning scheme which arguably had a greater impact
on racial minorities than on whites. The Court held that zoning
ordinances would not be overturned solely on a showing of "racially
disproportionate impact"; proof of "intent or purpose" to discriminate
on the basis of race was required.'
Other courts have responded to demographic pressures and
aesthetic deterioration in varied ways. Many cases are consistent with
the holdings in Arlington Heights, Belle Terre, and Petaluma;19 in
12. Id. at 9.
13. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (upheld single-family, one-acre zoning provision
which precluded low-cost housing for Mexican-Americans).
14. Id. at 254.
15. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (five-year plan
limiting building permits to 500 per year found constitutional-the plan was a
reasonable exercise of the police power, did not violate due process rights of builders
and landowners, and was not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce).
16. Id. at 908-09.
17. 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977).
18. Id. at 563. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). It indicated that courts would examine legislation more closely when
there is proof that a discriminatory purpose was a "motivating factor" in the legislative
decision. 97 S. Ct. at 566.
19. See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st
Cir. 1972) (three- and six-acre minimum); LaSalle Natl Bank v. City of Evanston, 312
N.E.2d 625 (Ill. 1974) (no buildings over 35 feet high); Wilson v. Town of Sherborn,
326 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (two-acre minimum); County Commissioners v.
Miles, 228 A.2d 450 (Md. 1967) (five-acre minimum for 6.7% of county) ; Flora Realty &
Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 246 S.W.2d 771 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952)
(three-acre minimum); Riverview Park, Inc. v. Town of Hinsdale, 313 A.2d 733 (N.H.
1973) (limit of 350 mobile home permits in an area of 20 square miles); Taxpayers
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other instances, courts have refused to uphold restrictive zoning
ordinances at the expense of rights protected under the federal and
state constitutions.20
In Florida courts and in federal courts, zoning laws have generally
been upheld; zoning is considered a legislative, rather than judicial,
function. 21 Comprehensive zoning codes are presumed to be valid,
and the plaintiff has the burden of proving the invalidity of the
ordinance under attack.22 In other words, if it is "fairly debatable"
whether the ordinance serves the public interest, it will be held
valid.23
This does not mean zoning ordinances are always valid; to serve the
public interest, an ordinance must promote some substantial aspect
of the general welfare.2 4 Therefore, upon sufficient showing that an
ordinance does not promote a substantial aspect of the general welfare,
Ass'n of Weymouth Township, Inc. v. Weymouth Township, 364 A.2d 1016 (N.J. 1976)
(permitted age discrimination in favor of the elderly in housing in accordance with a
comprehensive municipal code); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291
(N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (growth problems justified phased growth
plan); Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 306 A.2d 151 (Conn. C.P. Hartford County 1973)
(no apartments beyond 1500 units).
20. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (moratorium on new subdivisions and
rezoning of proposed subdivision land to open space and park categories held racially
discriminatory); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 299 A.2d
828 (Md. 1973) (aesthetics alone do not justify use of the police power); Nickola v.
Township of Grand Blanc, 232 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 1975) (restricting trailer parks to 23
of 23,040 acres is exclusionary); Padover v. Township of Farmington, 132 N.W.2d 687
(Mich. 1965) (20,000 square feet minimum is exclusionary as specifically applied to
plaintiffs' property); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (environmental reasons are
insufficient excuses for limiting housing to single-family dwellings on large lots); Berenson
v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975) (zoning board must consider the
needs of the region as well as the city with respect to housing); Township of Willistown
v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975) (allowing apartments in only 80
of 11,589 acres is exclusionary); Town of Gloucester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc.,
300 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1973) (allowing only 30 mobile homes to a park regardless of acreage
is unconstitutionally exclusionary); Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 211 S.E.2d 48 (Va.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975) (one-acre minimum lot size is arbitrary and dis-
criminatory).
21. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, Watson v.
Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So. 2d 368, 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
22. City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 1968); City of Miami
Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1956), quoting City of Miami Beach v. Silver,
67 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1953).
23. City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d at 317; City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen,
86 So. 2d at 444, citing City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953).
24. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 150; Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d
214,-217 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (reversed zoning board's denial of a request foi
rezoning from agricultural to low density multiple units where restrictive ordinance
was not "substantially related" to general welfare).
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it may be said to be no longer "fairly debatable" that the public
interest is being served, in which case further enforcement would be
"arbitrary, unreasonable or confiscatory. ' ' 2 5 But even when zoning laws
are invalidated, the courts will not take it upon themselves to rezone. 26
Rather, the function of the court is to determine at what point zoning
restrictions become arbitrary.27
A zoning ordinance is constitutional only when a rational relation-
ship exists between the ordinance and some aspect of the police power.
The state's police power, however, encompasses a wide range of legiti-
mate public interests.2s Therefore, the purposes for which a city may
employ zoning tools are extremely broad. Zoning involves the considera-
tion of future growth and development, in addition to consideration
of the adequacy of drainage and storm sewers, public streets, pedestrian
walkways, and density of population.29 An additional function of zoning
is to protect an owner's enjoyment of his home from the encroachment
of commercial development. 0 Finally, the enhancement of aesthetic
appeal through zoning has been held to be a valid exercise of the police
power in the interest of the public welfare."' As a result, some personal
and property rights must give way in the interest of public welfare.s2
But an owner will not be required to sacrifice his rights absent a sub-
stantial public need. 33 In sum, if a zoning ordinance is arbitrary and
unreasonable and has no reasonably debatable relation to the general
public welfare, it will be held invalid.3 4
25. City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d at 316; Rural New Town, Inc. v.
Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (court reversed
zoning board where developer had been denied rezoning from agricultural to residential).
26. City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1969) (trial court order
rezoning residential property found violative of the separation of powers doctrine).
27. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla. 1965) (since property adjacent to an
airport was unsuitable for a classification more restrictive than an industrial classifica-
tion, owner was entitled to rezoning).
28. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 87 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d at 837-38; Watson v. Mayflower
Property, Inc., 223 So. 2d 368, 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (court willing to employ
zoning tools to protect the economic value of existing land uses).
30. Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So. 2d at 373.
31. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d at 89 (elimination of abandoned gas stations);
Sunad, Inc., v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 1960) (commercial signs); Merritt
v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1953) (commercial signs); City of Miami Beach v.
Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364, 367 (Fla. 1941) (motels and apartments rather than
businesses).
For recent discussions of aesthetics in zoning, see Uddo, Land Use Controls:
Aesthetics, Past and Future, 21 Loy. L. REv. 851 (1975); 4 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 163 (1976);
11 URB. L. ANN. 295 (1976).
32. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d at 445.
53. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d at 823.
34. City of Miami v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d at 838, accord, Stone v. City of Maitland,
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II. Two APPROACHES TO GROWTH-RELATED PROBLEMS
An analysis of two attempts to control or halt growth, comparing
the so-called "Petaluma Plan" (Petaluma, California) with the "Boca
Cap" (Boca Raton, Florida) may give some insight into the limits on
the zoning power.
The Petaluma Plan, s5 enacted for a period of five years, fixes the
number of new building permits to be issued at 500 per year and
requires that they be divided evenly between the east and west sections
of town and between single-family units and multiple residential units.
The Plan also imposes a 200-foot wide greenbelt around the city,
beyond which city facilities cannot be extended for five to fifteen years.
Other innovative aspects of the Plan include the Residential Develop-
ment Control System, an intricate point system whereby a builder
accumulates points for conformity to the plan, for aesthetic design, or
for providing low- or moderate-income housing. Significantly, the Plan
requires that eight to twelve percent of all approved housing be for
low- and moderate-income persons s. 3
The Boca Cap limits housing development in the City of Boca
Raton, Florida, to a total of 40,000 dwelling units.3 7 The ordinance
was initially brought before the electorate of Boca Raton pursuant to
the initiative and referendum section of the city charter.38 Impetus for
the Boca Cap arose because the local citizens were greatly concerned
about the already rapid growth of Boca Raton and the possible adverse
effect of major proposed developments,3 9 and because the citizens did
446 F.2d at 87, citing City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ("sub-
stantial" relation to public welfare required).
35. In 1971 the City of Petaluma, California, alarmed by its accelerated rate of
growth, the increased demand for housing, and the problem of urban sprawl, enacted a
temporary "freeze" on development. During the "freeze," the city council formulated the
Petaluma Plan which was adopted in 1972. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
36. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 900-01.
37. The Boca Cap was an amendment to article XII of the city charter of Boca
Raton, Florida, setting a limitation on the number of dwelling units in the city. Section
12.09 reads:
The total number of dwelling units within the existing boundaries of the City
is hereby limited to forty thousand (40,000). No building permit shall be issued
for the construction of a dwelling unit within the City which would permit the
total number of dwelling units within the City to exceed forty thousand
(40,000).
Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. 65 (Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County 1976).
38. Id. at 71.
39. Id. at 70. Boca Raton's population grew from 992 in 1950 to 28,506 in 1970
and to 43,000 in 1974. Id. at 69. It was on this basis that two major developers, Behring
and Arvida, contemplated building approximately 25,000 housing units in the un-
incorporated western section of Boca Raton, which was annexed prior to adoption of the
Cap. Id. at 69.
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not trust the city council to make the all-important decision about
optimum city size.40 On November 2, 1972, in a storm of controversy,
the Boca Cap was adopted as an amendment to the city charter by a
vote of 7,722 to 5,626.41
Almost immediately after the enactment of the Boca Cap, the city
council imposed a building moratorium.4 2 Still later, the voters rejected,
by a margin of two to one, a city council proposal which would have
increased the growth ceiling from 40,000 to 44,000 units.43 With this
inescapable mandate from the people, the city council enacted a series
of across-the-board density reductions; implementation was completed
on March 26, 1974, when the council permanently enacted a fifty per-
cent across-the-board density reduction and repealed the prior temporary
measures.
44
Since the enactment of the Boca Cap, three plaintiffs have filed
suit seeking its invalidation. 45 Arvida Corporation, a major developer,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida.4 The district court abstained in order to allow Florida's
courts to interpret the Boca Cap in light of state statutes and the Florida
Constitution, thereby avoiding Arvida's federal fourteenth amendment
claim. In so doing, the district court expressly recognized the need to
defer to Florida courts in light of Florida's evolving growth policy.47
On June 7, 1974, Arvida filed the same claim against Boca Raton
in Florida circuit court, 48 alleging that the Boca Cap violated the United
States and Florida Constitutions. Arvida further alleged that Boca
Raton was estopped from repealing by referendum zoning variances
which allowed density increases for Arvida's property. The constitu-
40. 1d. at 80-81. This air of distrust grew out of the city council's decision to grant
Arvida Corporation zoning variances which increased population density. These variances
were passed on February 8, 1972, over vehement citizen protest. Petitions were circulated
almost immediately by citizens seeking to initiate a referendum. As a result, the
ordinances were repealed. City's Post-Trial Brief at 10-11.
41. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 71.
42. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 8.
43. City's Post-Trial Brief at 12.
44. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 73. It is important to note, however,
that on May 4, 1974, the city council enacted City Ordinance No. 1966, which requires
review of the Boca Cap and reevaluation by the electorate at two-year intervals. City's
Post-Trial Brief at 14.
45. Arvida Corporation, Boca Villas Corporation, and Keating-Meredith Properties,
Inc. are large developers with extensive Boca Raton properties, on which they want
to build high density dwellings.
46. Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, No. 72-2006 (S.D. Fla. April 3, 1974).
47. Id., slip op. at 2-3. The district court, however, retained jurisdiction pending
resolution of state issues in state courts. Id. at 8.
48. Letter from Gerald F. Richman, counsel for Arvida, to Joe G. Dykes, Jr. (Sept.
3, 1976).
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tional issues were severed for trial at a later time, and the claim of
equitable estoppel was rejected.4 9 The circuit court stated that the
citizens of Boca Raton had reserved final decision on the density
issue through the referendum process and had exercised it in a timely
fashion.50
Additional lawsuits were filed by Boca Villas Corporation and
Keating-Meredith Properties, Inc.51 These actions were consolidated for
trial on the merits. Plaintiffs alleged that the Boca Cap violated the
right to travel, increased housing pressure in surrounding communi-
ties, excluded low-income groups, and was unnecessary. 52 In addition,
both plaintiffs alleged that the adoption of the Boca Cap by referen-
dum was violative of procedural due process. 53
The circuit court did not reach these issues because it found the
Boca Cap and its implementing ordinances violative of substantive
49. Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, No. 74-1431, slip op. at 14 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Palm Beach County, Aug. 18, 1976). In rejecting Arvida's claim of equitable estoppel,
the court found that Arvida could not meet the test for equitable estoppel in zoning
cases as set out by Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10,
15-16 (Fla. 1976), citing Salkolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963).
The test requires that the property owner "(1) in good faith (2) upon some act or
omission of the government (3) has made such a substantial change in position or has
incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable
and unjust to destroy the right he acquired." Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton,
slip op. at 11.
50. Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, slip op. at 14. The court relied on City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), which apparently provides
the basis to resolve a conflict of authority in Florida. Andover Development Corp. v.
City of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) and City of
Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) represent the
divergent positions regarding the validity of referendum approval of city ordinances.
The United States Supreme Court in Eastlake adopted essentially the same position
as that set forth in Carmichael. According to this interpretation, a referendum is not a
delegation of power to the people; it is a valid reservation of power which might
have been otherwise delegated to a legislative body. But if a referendum action is
arbitrary, capricious, and without relation to the police power, its result will be invalid
regardless of the wishes of the voters. Quoting its own earlier opinion in Hunter v.
Erikson, the Eastlake court asserted: "'The sovereignty of the people is itself subject
to [federal] constitutional limitations . . .' Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S., at 392." 426
U.S. at 676. Absent such a situation, "the referendum process does not, in itself, violate ...
the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Id. at 679 (footnote omitted). The Court pointed
out, however, that the reasonableness of the referendum result "is open to challenge
in state court, where the scope of the state remedy available . ..would be determined
as a matter of state law, as well as under Fourteenth Amendment standards." Id. at 677.
51. Boca Villas Corporation filed suit on January 15, 1973, and Keating-Meredith
Properties, Inc. filed suit on March 22, 1973. Letter from Gerald F. Richman, counsel for
Arvida, to Joe G. Dykes, Jr. (Sept. 3, 1976).
52. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 66-67.
53. Id. at 67; see note 50 suIpra. For further discussion of the validity of referenda
in the zoning process, see 9 AKRON L. REV. 175 (1975); 64 CAL. L. RaV. 74 (1976); 24
CLEv. ST. L. REV. 635 (1975); 44 U. CIN. L. RaV. 859 (1975).
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due process and equal protection . 4 Specifically, the court found the
Boca Cap to be irrational,55 arbitrary, and discriminatory,56 and with-
out sufficient "substantial benefit" to the public welfare of Boca Raton
"as to completely override private property rights. ' 1 7
Next, the court weighed costs against benefits. It found that any
minimal benefit resulting from the Cap was clearly outweighed by the
city-wide $50,000,000 diminution of property values and by the city
council's "implementation fiasco," which imposed density reductions
solely on multi-family housing.5 Plaintiffs were prevented from
beneficially using their property; therefore, the implementing ordi-
nances were held to be confiscatory as applied to plaintiff's property."
Because the circuit court found the Boca Cap to be an unconstitu-
tional taking, it declined to address the question of whether Florida
recognizes a constitutional right to adequate housing. But the court
noted that other state courts have required expanding communities
to share with communities in their particular region the impact of
housing demands"0 and found that the Boca Cap eliminated the
possibility of private construction of low- and moderate-income
housing.61 In sum, impact on housing was only one factor in the court's
assessment of the Boca Cap's rationality, rather than the primary means
by which it was held to be unconstitutional.62 The court chose to
remain within the traditional framework of federal constitutional law,
refusing to apply available alternative theories to invalidate the Boca
Cap.65
54. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 81. The circuit court's decision has
been appealed. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., No. 76-2322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct:
App., filed Nov. 1, 1976).
. 55. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 74. The court found the Boca Cap
to be irrational because it imposes an unknown burden on taxpayers in that they may
eventually have to buy land which is vacant because of the Cap, and because it inhibits
reasonable and needed reclassification of land use. Id. at 74-75.
56. Id. at 75. According to the court, the Boca Cap is arbitrary and discriminatory
in that it imposes a 50% density reduction solely on multi-family housing without
attempting to determine the reasonableness of the densities imposed. Id. at 75.
57. Id. at 76.
58. Id. at 78.
59. Id. at 80.
60. Id. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); In re Kitmar Builders, Inc., 268
A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970). For recent discussion of the problems of housing and exclusionary
zoning, see Ackermen, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of
Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Williams, On From Mount Laurel: Guidelines on
the "Regional General Welfare," 1 VT. L. REv. 23 (1976); 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 115 (1976);
30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 475 (1976); 21 VILL. L. REv. 701 (1976); 16 WASHBURN L.J. 176 (1976).
61. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 79.
62. Id. at81.
63. The circuit court relied primarily upon Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S6
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Property owners and developers have frequently sought to have
zoning ordinances invalidated on one of two grounds: that the ordi-
nance constitutes a taking of property without just compensation; or
that it violates the constitutional right to travel or the (yet uncertain)
right to housing. As we shall see below, the Petaluma Plan fares better
under any attack than does the Boca Cap.
A. The Taking Question
Clearly, the issue of whether a zoning ordinance effects a taking of
property without due process of law is a significant challenge to
attempts to control or limit population growth. Generally, however,
courts will interfere only when the actions of a city council are "so
unreasonable and unjustified as to amount to confiscation of property. ' ' 64
Zoning ordinances, to be valid, must not be confiscatory.65 Nor can
the constitutional right to property be curtailed by unreasonable
restriction under the "guise of the police power.
66
The difficulty is to determine at what point a regulation of property
becomes a taking of property. In Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon,67 the United States Supreme Court stated "that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking ...."68 The Florida Supreme Court requires
that zoning be necessary for the public welfare; if it is not necessary,
zoning will constitute an unlawful taking.69 Further, if an ordinance
deprives an owner of the beneficial use of his property by preventing
all uses or the only use for which it is fit, it is invalid regardless of the
public welfare. 70
183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); and Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
64. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d 442, 445 (Fla. 1956).
65. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1941); Watson v. Mayflower
Property, Inc., 223 So. 2d 368, 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
66. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d 820, 823 (Fla. 1965).
67. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
68, ld. at 415.
69. Burritt v. Harris, 172 So. 2d at 822.
70. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d at 645 (reversed zoning which restricted
land use to single-family dwellings rather than hotels); Watson v. Mayflower Property,
Inc., 223 So. 2d at 373; City of Miami v. Zorovich, 195 So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1967), quoting Ford v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d at 645.
For an arguably contrary view, see Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1972). There the court upheld an injunction against filling a swamp and denied the
landowner compensation, holding that land regulation may be valid even if it restricts
an owner to "natural [though unprofitable] uses" of the land. This result was reached
under a legislative scheme similar to, but not as broad as, FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975).
See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.971, 144.26 (Supp. 1976).
ZONING AND POPULATION CONTROL
It was essentially for these reasons that the Boca Cap was in-
validated. Although the issue of necessity was hotly debated, it was
uncontroverted that Boca Raton had more than adequately accommo-
dated-without a cap-the existing population, and with it problems of
water supply, air quality, sewage treatment and fiscal resources. 1 Pro-
ponents of a plan like the Petaluma Plan would face similar problems
of demonstrating need for population control. The Petaluma Plan,
however, seems to be a less drastic alternative for limiting growth than
the Boca Cap.
At present, the Boca Cap would not completely deprive plaintiffs
of the use of their property. It will, however, diminish their property's
value to the extent that they cannot recover their original investment.7 2
But a zoning ordinance is not void solely because it causes an increase
or decrease in property values.73 Nor is an ordinance necessarily void
because it deprives an owner of his property's most advantageous use.74
Finally, it has been held that depriving an owner of all use of his
property is not confiscatory when total deprivation is preceded by an
"amortization" period.7 5
At some point, however, 40,000 dwelling units will have been con-
structed in Boca Raton; at that time, under the Boca Cap, property
owners holding undeveloped land will be deprived of virtually all
possible uses. But the Petaluma Plan places no fixed limit on growth;
it merely limits the rate of growth.7 6 In merely controlling the growth
rate, the Petaluma Plan has attempted to plan for the future, not
deny it as Boca Raton has done.
B. The Right To Travel, or Alternatively, the Right to Housing
Another method by which a plaintiff may induce a court to in-
validate restrictive zoning is to demonstrate that such zoning violates
the constitutional right to travel.7 7 Although the United States Supreme
71. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 76-78.
72. Id. at 80.
73. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d at 445.
74. Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So. 2d at 373; City of Miami v. Zorovich,
195 So. 2d at 36.
75. E.B. Elliot Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1155 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 805 (1970) (upheld ordinance prohibiting advertising signs near
expressways in attempt to preserve highway safety and aesthetics).
76. This is not to say that restricting an owner's use of his property to a greenbelt
for 15 years is not a significant interference with his property rights; it is, but this
alternative is still less intrusive than an absolute limit on growth.
77. For recent discussion of the right to travel and zoning cases, see Carmichael, Land
Use Controls and the Right to Travel, 6 CuM. L. REv. 541 (1976); Note, Municipal
Self-Determination: Must Local Control of Growth Yield to Travel Rights?, 17 Aiuz. L.
Rav. 145 (1975); Note, Durational Residence Requirements From Shapiro Through Sosna:
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Court has not yet agreed upon the constitutional source of the right
to travel, it has repeatedly affirmed its existence.78 "'The right to
travel' . . . is a virtually unconditional personal right .... ,79 In Me-
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County,80 the Supreme Court stated:
"[T]he right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new resi-
dents the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in
the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents." '
Most classifications which penalize the fundamental right to travel
will trigger the "compelling state interest" test.
8 2
Thus, at some point attempts to limit or control population growth
through zoning may be impermissibly violative of the constitutional
right to travel.8 3 And this is precisely what the district court held in
Petaluma.8 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, relying on Warth v. Seldin, 5 ruled, however, that the county
The Right to Travel Takes A New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 622 (1975); Note, Freedom
of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564 (1975).
78. E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (durational
residency requirements for free hospital care unconstitutional); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirements to vote void); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (durational residency requirements for welfare benefits void).
79. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 643 (citations omitted).
80. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
81. Id. at 261.
82. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634; accord, Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1974) (six-month residence requirement for obtaining divorce upheld); Hall v.
King, 266 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1972) (statute requiring registration of real estate broker
be revoked if he has become nonresident denied equal protection to broker who moved
from state). Contra, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (one-year residency requirement
for obtaining a divorce did not violate federal constitutional right to travel).
83. Assuming arguendo that zoning infringes the right to travel interstate, there is a
split of authority as to whether intrastate travel is also a constitutionally protected
right. In King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the right to travel applies to intrastate as well as interstate activity. Accord,
Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). Contra, Wardwell v. Board of Educ.,
529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976).
84. 375 F. Supp. at 586.
85. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth, the Supreme Court denied standing to a host
of plaintiffs seeking to invalidate exclusionary zoning by requiring, with certain narrow
exceptions, that they allege actual injury and assert their own rights. But see Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. at 563, in which
the Court granted standing to a potential buyer to contest the racially discriminatory
nature of a particular zoning scheme. The Court also granted standing to a developer
to assert its own economic rights, but left open the question of whether it could assert
the rights of third parties not present.
In Florida, the standard may not be so rigid, at least with respect to state claims.
Any person having a legally recognizable interest which is adversely affected by a pro-
posed zoning action will have standing to sue. The interest may be one shared in
common with a number of people (for example, where an entire neighborhood is
affected), but the plaintiff must have an interest beyond that shared with the whole
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Construction Industry Association and the landowners lacked standing
to contest the Petaluma Plan as violative of third parties' right to
travel.8 6 Since the Ninth Circuit did not reach the question of whether
the Petaluma Plan violated the right to travel, the utility of the right-
to-travel argument in zoning litigation is still uncertain.
In Maricopa County, however, the Supreme Court held that
durational residency requirements for free medical care created an
"invidious classification" which violated newcomers' right to travel by
denying them the "basic necessities of life."' 7 Such a classification is
valid only upon a showing of compelling state interest.88 Furthermore,
in Maricopa County, the Court recognized shelter as one of the "basic
necessities of life."89 Some state courts have gone even further and have
required local governments to provide for a variety of housing in
their land use plans, thereby insuring adequate housing for all income
groups within the particular region.90 In the words of the Court of
Appeals of New York:
While the people of New Castle may fervently desire to be left
alone by the forces of change, the ultimate determination is not
solely theirs .... Until the day comes when regional, rather than
local, governmental units can make such determinations, the courts
must assess the reasonableness of what the locality has done.91
Thus, zoning ordinances which proscribe the construction of low- and
community. Factors to consider include proximity to property being rezoned, character
of the neighborhood, and type of change proposed. Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d
832, 837 (Fla. 1972).
For further discussion of standing to sue in zoning cases, see Note, Standing to Sue
under the Model Land Development Code, 9 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 649 (1976); Note, Alter-
natives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary
Zoning Scheme, 11 URB. L. ANN. 223 (1976); 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 390 (1975); 9 CRIGrrON
L. REV. 817 (1976); 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 944 (1975).
86. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 905.
87. 415 U.S. at 269.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 254, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But the Supreme
Court has refused to guarantee a particular quality of housing. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
A constitutional right to housing is further disparaged by the holding in Arlington
Heights, where the Supreme Court suggested in a footnote that there was no reason
for "stringent review" merely because the case involved plaintiffs' interest in acquiring
housing. 97 S. Ct. at 560 n.5.
90. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle,
341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.? 341
A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975).
91. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d at 243,
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moderate-income housing arguably violate the right to travel and the
right to shelter as well.
The Boca Cap and its implementing ordinances would potentially
have a far greater impact on regional housing supplies than the land
use plans rejected by the courts of New Jersey, New York or Pennsyl-
vania.92 By comparison, the Petaluma Plan provided specifically for
low- and moderate-income housing. Further, although Petaluma failed
to provide its share of regional housing, it did not, like Boca Raton,
impose an absolute limit beyond which it would not grow.
In Florida, growth control plans face additional challenges, al-
though these are not as persuasive as the confiscation, right to travel,
or right to housing arguments. Although some restriction of interstate
commerce, 3 deprivation of due process,94 and denial of equal protec-
tion 95 may be within the permissible exercise of the state's (and thus a
municipality's) police power, zoning must not unreasonably dis-
criminate.90 Any scheme to control or halt population growth must
overcome these legal obstacles.
At each point, the Petaluma Plan is a more defensible alternative
than the Boca Cap. The Petaluma Plan, although limiting building
permits to 500 per year, includes quality control for housing, a green-
belt, timed extension of city services, and a requirement that at least
eight to twelve percent of approved new construction be for low-cost
92. "[T]he Cap imposes an unnecessary low and moderate income housing burden
on neighboring communities and Boca Raton's neighbors are presently unable to fulfill
this demand." Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 79-80.
93. A state may impinge upon interstate commerce in order to promote the welfare
of its citizens, provided that it does not impose an unreasonable burden and that the
ordinance does not arbitrarily discriminate against interstate commerce. R. G. Indus.,
Inc. v. Askew, 276 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973); Joe Hatton, Inc. v. Conner, 240 So. 2d 145,
147 (Fla. 1970).
94. If there is a reasonable relation between the zoning ordinance and some valid
aspect of the general welfare, the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment are satisfied. See Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 87-88 (5th Cir. 1971);
E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1151 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 805 (1970).
95. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d at 88 (equal protection goes no further than
protection against "invidious discrimination"); E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 425 F.2d at 1153 (it is sufficient for equal protection that an ordinance
promotes a reasonable state interest and is not arbitrary).
Note, however, that the circuit court decision in Boca Villas was based in part on
equal protection. The court found that the 50% across-the-board density reductions were
arbitrary and discriminatory in that they were imposed solely against multi-family
housing without analysis of the impact of each individual development. Boca Villas Corp.
v, Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. at 74, 81.
96. United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799, 813 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusal to permit a proposed low-income housing project
to tie into a city's existing water and sewer systems was racially discriminatory). Accord,
State ex rel. S.A, Lynch Corp. v, Danner, 33 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. 1947).
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housing. The Boca Cap, on the other hand, imposes an absolute limit
on growth of 40,000 housing units. Implementing ordinances effect a
fifty percent across-the-board density reduction solely on multi-family
housing, the type generally most accessible to low-income groups in a
rapidly developing community and, significantly, make no provision
for low-income housing. 7 Absent a compelling state interest, such a
burden should not be shifted to the already overcrowded surrounding
communities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Palm Beach circuit court held the Boca Cap to be
an unconstitutional taking,98 in general Florida courts are notably re-
luctant to invalidate zoning ordinances. 99 They are equally reluctant
to completely deprive an owner of the use of his property.10° In resolving
the conflict between residents and development interests, however,
Florida courts have been willing to substantially diminish property
rights, short of promoting confiscation, in the interest of the public
welfare.'""
It is possible that Florida courts will find both growth-controlling
(the Petaluma Plan) and growth-limiting (the Boca Cap) schemes
constitutional, if confronted with severe problems of crowding and
environmental degradation. At some point problems of sewage treat-
ment, waste disposal, overcrowding, and water rationing can become
so severe as to create a compelling state interest in population control
and land use. If this occurs, a critical question still remains: will
Florida courts require compensation for landowners who have been
deprived of the use of their property, or simply limit them to the
"natural uses" of their land without compensation?'0 ' The answer may
well depend upon the constitutional analysis used to justify the land
use scheme.
But rights other than a property owner's right to compensation
are at stake when a city attempts to limit growth. In Dunn v. Blum-
stein,10 3 the United States Supreme Court held that a state must always
employ the least intrusive means to a legitimate end when fundamental
97. Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence, 45 Fla. Supp. 65.
98. Id. at 80.
99. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1956).
100. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, I So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1941).
101. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1956).
102. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972); FLA. STAT.
chs. 163, 380 (1975).
103. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requiremenit to vote was unconstitu,
tionally violative of the right to travel),
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rights are infringed upon. 0 4 Applying Dunn to the problem of popula-
tion control, a system of planned or timed growth would seem to be
required in place of a system which denies growth altogether, unless
a compelling state interest justifies the latter. The "least intrusive
means" test might not preclude the use of drastic population control
measures such as a cap. In the words of the trial judge in Boca Villas:
"If a reduction in Boca Raton's overall residential densities to 40,000
units would rationally promote public welfare without unnecessary and
unreasonable consequences to private property rights, the city could
legally utilize a variety of techniques, including a form of Cap [to
control growth]."' 10 5
Population control measures such as the Boca Cap or the Petaluma
Plan are relatively recent innovations, and, as yet, courts have been
reluctant to resolve related issues other than by relying on established
precedent. The right to housing, recognized by a minority of state
courts, has yet to be considered in Florida. The scope of the right
to travel has not yet been defined for want of a plaintiff with standing.
In the Boca Cap litigation, such theories were before the circuit court,
but the court chose to rely primarily on Nectow and Pennsylvania
Coal to find the Boca Cap unconstitutional. 10 6 The result was correct
but the reasoning strained.
The better course is for Florida courts to follow the lead of the
highest courts of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania-holding as
a matter of state constitutional law that growing communities in Florida
must provide in their comprehensive plans for low- and moderate-
income housing.10 7 The need to base such decisions on state law is
particularly important in light of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions such as Arlington Heights and Warth v. Seldin, which suggest
the Court's unwillingness to become involved in local housing
problems.l 8
JoE G. DYKES, JR.
104. Id. at 343.
105. 45 Fla. Supp. at 68.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Florida courts could conceivably find a constitutional right to travel or to
housing in Article I of the Florida Constitution-the Declaration of Rights-which pro-
vides:
Section 1. Political power.-All political power is inherent in the people. The
enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others
retained by the people.
Section 2. Basic rights.-All natural persons are equal before the law and
have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and
liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess
and protect property ....
108. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555
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(1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court
avoided United States Supreme Court review of its decision in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975), by holding that access to housing was a right as a matter of state constitu-
tional law. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between state and federal
constitutional law, see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
